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CHURCH AND STATE: HOW MUCH SEPARATION?
ROBERT G. WECLEW
HE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION makes no mention of "separation of
Church and State." There are only three sections of the Consti-
tution which concern themselves with religion. The first amend-
ment says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free. exercise thereof ..... " A religious test
may not be required as a qualification to any office or public trust
under the United States.' "If any bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its re-
turn...."2
The phrase, "separation of Church and State," found its first ex-
pression in American constitutional case law in 1878 in a case involv-
ing religious freedom in the practice of polygamy.8 It did not involve
the establishment section of the first amendment. The Court quoted
Thomas Jefferson who in reply to a communication from the Dan-
bury Baptist Association had taken occasion to say:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and
his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the
legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,-I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting the estab-
1 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, S 3.
2 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
8 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall
of separation between Church and State. Adhering to this expression of the
supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with
sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man
to all h*s natural rights .... 4
"Separation" attained an absolute quality in 1946 when the Supreme
Court held:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or dis-
beliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, what-
ever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and state." 5
The "wall of separation" metaphor attained its greatest force in
1948 when the Supreme Court for the first and only time denied the
right of a subdivision of a state to aid religious education, the Court
finding that the use of the state's compulsory attendance law and
public school buildings by religious groups in furtherance of a re-
leased time program violated the first amendment establishment clause
which is part of the "liberty" of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause.6 In a 1952 case the Court permitted a released time
program for religious education off the school premises but upheld
the principles of Everson v. Board of Educ. and McCollum v. Board
of Educ. when it said: "We follow the McCollum case."'7
Is the "wall" impenetrable and fixed or is it permeable and lacking
in definite boundaries? Can the absolutist position be justified and
apparent exceptions explained on the ground that they do not conflict
with the absolutist position? Or is that position untenable? The issue
is most current, as witness, for example, the controversy under the
recent Federal Aid to Education proposals.8 Also witness the revival
4 Id. at 164.
5 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
6 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
7 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
8 Hearings on Bills to Provide Federal Assistance to States for Elementary and Local
Schools Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Senate Committee on Labor and
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of "the religious issue" in national politics following Catholic John F.
Kennedy's nomination for President.'
Five positions in the inter-relationship between Church and State may
be considered in connection with establishment of religion: (1) Gov-
ernment gives its full support and authority to making a particular re-
ligious sect the state religion, as in England; (2) Government grants a
preference to one or more sects; (3) Government aids all religions; (4)
Government co-operates with all religions; (5) Government assumes
an attitude of absolute neutrality toward all religions. There is very
little responsible support for Government's doing (1) or (2) in this
country. It has been argued that Government's maintaining an attitude
of absolute neutrality, (5), is in effect being "neutral in favor of"
secularism as opposed to religion and in effect is assistance in the estab-
lishment of a state religion of secularism.' ° In addition, absolute neu-
trality in our pluralistic society would violate the freedom clause of
the first amendment in many instances. Absolute neutrality is virtually
impossible. The real problems are in (3) and (4), and to a lesser degree
in (5).
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being."" Our history, case law, statutes, customs and traditions re-
flect frequent recognition of, co-operation with, and direct, indirect,
and incidental aid to religion and to religion's supporters. Our Decla-
ration of Independence includes the words "God," "Creator," "Su-
preme Judge of the World," and "Divine Providence." The North-
west Ordinance of 1787, part of the organic law of our country, con-
tains the following relevant provision regarding religion: "Religion,
morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged."12 At this time schools were private and main-
ly religious.
Madison and Jefferson, who had considerable to do with the draft-
Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 508, 527 (1959); Hearings on H.R. 22, School
Support Act of 1959, Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 552, 557 (1959).
9 Life, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 32; Newsweek, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 61.
loChandler, Book Review, 14 LAW & CoNnrMP. PROB. 164, 166 (1949); Herberg,
justice for Religious Schools, 98 AMmicA 190 (1957).
11 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
1 July 13, 1787, 1 Star. 52, art. III.
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ing and passage of the first amendment, were not opposed to co-
operation with religion. Madison's initial recommendation regarding
that amendment was as follows: "The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any na-
tional religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext infringed." 13 Jeffer-
son's record does not show opposition to aid and co-operation despite
the fact that he authored the "wall of separation" slogan.
The young men who designed the government of the United States ... saw
no walls separating science, philosophy, religion and art.... Jefferson in partic-
ular sought to rescue religious belief from the kind of state sponsorship or en-
tanglement that frequently lead to injustice and discrimination. His argument
was not against faith but against monopoly and political power under religious
auspices.14
That Jefferson did not equate support of religion or religious educa-
tion with establishment is indicated by his use of United States funds
for chaplains in the Army and Navy and in Congress, and for religious
education among the Indians, and his recommendation to the Univer-
sity of Virginia of a theological school, a room for religious worship,
and arrangements for religious instruction to students. 5
That the wal.f'separation is "low and fluid" is the opinion of one
constitutional law scholar, well expressed as follows:
That bloodstream must be kept separate by the walls of the circulatory system.
A break in them is disastrous. And yet the blood performs its living function only
as it nourishes the whole body, giving health and vigor to all its activities. It is
some such ... [expression] as this which seeks expression in Jefferson's "wall of
separation." But men who claim to follow him have tranformed his figure into
one of mechanical divisions and exclusions. 16
One of the greatest constitutional law authorities, Justice Story, did
not mistake establishment for aid when he said:
The real object of the [first] amendment was not to countenance, much less to
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity;
but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national
ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive pa-
tronage of the national government.' 7
13 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789-1791).
14 Cousins, What the Founding Fathers Believed, The Saturday Rev., Mar. 22, 1958,
pp. 15, 17.
15 O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 200 (1949); Editorial,
"No Law but Our Own Prepossessions"? 34 A.B.A.J. 482 (1948).
16 Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation between Church and State, 14 LAW & CON-
TMP. PROB. 61, 69 (1949).
17 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION S 1877 (5th. ed. 1891).
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The purpose of the first amendment was to leave the establishment
of religion within the sphere of the states. 'hen the Bill of Rights
was adopted, five states had established Protestant churches. It was
not until 1833 that the last of these state-supported churches lost its
favored position, indicating that the amendment was neither for nor
against establishment in the states. Since Congress could make no law
concerning establishment, a religion could not be set up by Congress
for the entire nation, and Congress could not legislate for or against
religion in the states.18 The amendment's real importance lay in the
separation created between state and federal spheres, and not in the
matter of separation of Church and State."9 The members of the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 desired assurance that the federal gov-
ernment would not set up a national church nor interfere with the
various types of establishments, quasi-establishments and church gov-
ernment arrangements then existing in the various states.20 The pur-
pose of the first amendment was to prohibit any federal law either for
or against one religion or one religious group.2' It was a problem in
federalism, the states being concerned with interference with their
sovereignty by affirmative action establishing a national religion or by
negative action disestablishing their states' establishments. Establish-
ment read in conjunction with the tenth amendment was a reservation
of power to the states. 2
In 1833 it was held that the Bill of Rights applies only to the federal
government.2 After adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868
doubt arose as to the amendment's application to state religious estab-
lishments. Accordingly, Senator Blaine in 1876 introduced a resolu-
tion for a constitutional amendment providing:
No state shall make any law respecting a religious establishment or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any state for the
support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect
18 O'Neill, Nonpreferential Aid to Religion Is Not an Establishment of Religion, 2
BUFFALO L. REv. 242 (1953).
19 Corwin, The Supreme Court as a National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
3,14 (1949).
20 O'BRIEN, JUsTIcE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 129 (1958).
21 O'NEILL, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 43 (1952).
22 Snec, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CATH. LAW.
301,318 (1955).
28 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
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or domination nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided
between religious sects and denominations.2 4
In 1925 it was held that freedom of speech and press are among the
fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment against infringement by the
states.2 5 In 1940 it was held that the fourteenth amendment embraced
freedom of religion of the first amendment, and a dictum indicated it
embraced establishment.26 The Everson case in 1946 made the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment applicable to the states by way
of the fourteenth amendment.27
It is easy to see how freedom of speech, religion, press, and assem-
bly have been interpreted as "liberties," but difficult to view establish-
ment in the same way. Corwin expresses this view when he says: "So
far as the Fourteenth is concerned, states are entirely free to establish
religions provided they do not deprive anyone of religious liberty. It is
only liberty that the Fourteenth protects. ' 28 Snee expresses the same
thought when he says:
If Madison and the other framers of the first amendment considered the estab-
lishment clause to be anything more than a reservation of power to the states,
it was as a political duty imposed upon the federal government. Even if meant
as an additional safeguard to religious freedom from federal encroachment, it
does not thereby become a constitutional right of a citizen. Hence, however wise
the additional safeguard may be, it is not in itself a liberty, and certainly is not
so fundamental as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 29
THE CASES
Cases decided by the various state courts indicate a hopeless division
as to what practices violate establishment and why. The cases below
are mainly United States Supreme Court cases, with some state cases
which indicate a line of reasoning the federal high court could use
without violating establishment. The cases below are intended to be
illustrative rather than exhaustive.
In the first important case concerning establishment to come before
the Supreme Court, the Court said:
24 4 CONG. REc. 5580 (1876).
25 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
26 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
27 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
28 Corwin, supra note 19, at 19.
29 Snee, supra note 22, at 318.
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Yet it is difficult to perceive that the legislature may not enact more laws
to effectually enable all sects to accomplish the great objects of religion, by giving
them corporate rights for the management of their property.... [T]he legisla-
ture could not create or continue a religious establishment which should have
exclusive rights. . . . But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to
be restrained, by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect to perform
their own religious duties, or by establishing funds for the support of ministers,
for public charities, for the endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the
dead.30
The case concerned itself with the Virginia Constitution rather than
the first amendment. It was, of course, decided before the passage of
the fourteenth amendment and illustrates the wide power the states
had to aid religion. The point of reference is religious freedom.
In the next significant case the Court had this to say: "The law
knows no heresy and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect."'" Two rival factions were both claiming
church property in this case, and the Court was concerned only with
what body in the sect was entitled to make the decisions, and not with
what decisions it made. The decision made by the highest body in the
church itself was the one sustained. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral32 the Court reached substantially the same result in a suit coming
up from a state court involving two factions of the Russian Orthodox
Church. A New York statute had the effect of transferring the ad-
ministration of the church from one group to another. Although
separation was mentioned, the Court rested its decision on free exer-
cise. This would seem to support a view that the establishment sec-
tion, especially with reference to state action, complements the reli-
gious guarantee and operates strictly or loosely only insofar as reli-
gious freedom would be advanced, 3 and is a political decision insur-
ing religious liberty. 4
In Millard v. Board of Educ.3 5 a local board of education rented
space in the basement of a church. A school was operated in the base-
ment of the church with all Catholic students and all Catholic teach-
ers. The pupils under the direction of a priest attended Mass each
morning before school. The Illinois court said the local board had the
30 Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49 (1815).
31 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
82 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
38 O'BRIEN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 186.
34 Costanzo, Federal Aid to Educ: and Religious Liberty, 36 U. DEr. L.J. 1, 6 (1958).
85 121 IWI. 297, 10 N.E. 669 (1887).
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right to rent of any person who had property suitable for public pur-
poses, that the school authorities could select teachers who belonged
to any church or no church so long as they exercised the essential ele-
ments of control, and compulsion to attend Mass was on the part of
the religious authorities and not the state. The case indicates that the
state does not have to refrain from doing. business with a religious.
group merely because it is a religious group,"' and that discrimination
in hiring a teacher because of her religion would violate her religious
freedom. The state cannot adopt a position which places religion in a
position where it has no rights which the law must protect.37
In Dunn v. Chicago Training School for Girls38 taxpayers filed suit
to restrain payment of amounts the county had appropriated for care
of girls committed to sectarian institutions. Payments to the school
consistently ran less than what it actually cost to maintain the girls.
The court here upheld the benefit to be paid on the grounds that reli-
gion cannot be excluded from all incidental benefits, value was re-
ceived, and the county was the beneficiary since payments were at less
than cost. No preference was found. The girls could not be excluded
from religious services merely because the county assumed control
over them. This would be an instance where complete separation
would restrain religious freedom. It is an area where the state as-
sumes a maximum degree of control over individuals as in prisons
and in the armed forces, where it furnishes them with chapels and
chaplains. Freedom of religion requires state co-operation and assist-
ance in these instances. Where aid is expressed in terms of separation
it arouses controversy, but if it is understood that co-operation and
aid may be given to individuals to avoid restraining their religious free-
dom, confusion and controversy lessen. 39
In Davis v. Beason4° the Court held that neither free exercise nor
establishment protects one who violates the criminal laws of the na-
tion. The Court held that "the First Amendment ... in declaring that
Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion
... was intended to.. . prohibit legislation for the support of any reli-
36 Accord, Schade v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 386 Pa. 507, 126 A. 2d 911 (1956).
37 Cushiman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitutional Law,
45 ILL. L. REv. 333, 348 (1950).
38 280 111. 613, 117 N.E. 735 (1917).
39 Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. Rv. 426, 428-429
(1953).
40 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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gious tenets, or the modes of worship of any sect."'" Here we clearly
see preference of one sect as the prohibition intended.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States42 affirms and reaffirms
that this is a religious nation. Herein are numerous instances of reli-
gious customs and observances to which the state is a party. In addi-
tion, the case operates to exempt ministers from a federal labor law
designed to prevent the influx of unskilled labor into this country, no
imputation being found to include ministers within the law. Murdock
v. Pennsylvania43 found that the selling of religious tracts could not be
licensed by a city. This, however, was on the basis of freedom of reli-
gion, the Court finding that the "state may not impose a charge for
the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution.' 44
Without referring to the establishment clause which, of course,
had not as yet been held absorbed into the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court in Petit v. Minnesota,45 speaking of a Minnesota law
which barred all labor except works of charity and necessity on Sun-
days, said:
We have uniformly recognized state laws relating to the observance of Sunday
as enacted in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the State.... [I]t was
within its [the legislature's] discretion to fix the day when all labor within, the
limits of the State . . .should cease. 4
6
In another "Sunday Closing" law case a New York statute prohibited
selling on Sunday except in certain cases.47 Defendants were con-
victed of selling uncooked meat in violation of the law. The court had
this to say:
It is not a "law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."... It does not set up a church, make attendance on religious
worship compulsory, impose restrictions upon expression of religious belief,
work a restriction upon the exercise of religion according to the dictates of one's
conscience, provide compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious
institutions, nor in any way enforce or prohibit religion. Although the so-called
Sunday laws may be said to have a religious origin, our statute ... has also recog-
nized that the first day of the week by general consent is set apart "for rest" in
accord with the general experience of mankind that it is wise and necessary to
set apart such a day . . . or both the physical and moral welfare of the ...
community. 48
41 Id. at 342. 4 Id. at 113.
42 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 45 177 U.S. 164 (1900).
43 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 46 1d. at 165.
47 People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E. 2d 184 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S.
907 (1951).
481d. at 79-80, 96 N.E. 2d at 186.
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Bradfield v. Roberts" gave a narrow construction to the establish-
ment clause, holding that financial assistance to a secular corporation
all of whose incorporators and officials are members of a particular
faith, is not synonymous with establishing a religion. Title to hospital
property was in this case in the Sisters of Charity, a Roman Catholic
organization, and these sisters operated the hospital, which was incor-
porated by act of Congress and was located in Washington, D.C. An
appropriation was made for the construction of isolation buildings,
and the District of Columbia commissioners entered into an agree-
ment with the hospital corporation to carry the appropriation into
effect. The Court found that there was no conflict with the establish-
ment clause. The religious opinions of the incorporators and members
were held not subject to inquiry. A 1949 case decided by the highest
Kentucky court is to the same effect;50 the court there held that the
fact that all members of a hospital board were members of one reli-
gion did not mean that money given to the hospital under the Hospital
Survey and Construction Act of 1946 (42 U.S.C.A. §291) was money
given to a particular denomination and that the test was not who
received the money but the character of the use.
From 1819 to 1899 Congress appropriated money to religious
groups to maintain sectarian schools among the Indians. This was part
of the civilizing process which promoted greater public security.
When the Indians ceased being a menace, and only then, was there a
concern that the government was aiding religion.5 It wasn't until
1908 that a case52 came before the Supreme Court attempting to test
the constitutionality of appropriations of this type. The Court held
that when Congress finally decided not to appropriate funds for In-
dian sectarian schools this applied only to public moneys raised by
general taxation, and did not prevent the expenditure of Indian treaty
and trust funds for maintenance of sectarian schools. To hold other-
wise would violate the free exercise of religion.
In 1908 the Court considered the status of the Roman Catholic
Church in territories acquired from Spain and held that the Church
had the same capacity to acquire and hold property and sue and be
sued in Puerto Rico that it had under Spanish law as the sole state
49 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
50 Kentucky Building Comm'ns v. Effron, 310 Ky. 355, 220 S.W. 2d 836 (1949).
51 Cushman, supra note 37, at 334.
52 Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
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recognized church. 3 The case involved federal action regarding reli-
gious establishment and even gave a preferred status to the Catholic
Church since it was then the only religious body existing on the
island.14
Even though direct governmental assistance were given to religion
it is difficult to see how such an appropriation could be attacked on
the federal level in view of the holding that a taxpayer lacks sufficient
interest to attack a federal appropriation.5 The rule in Frothingham
v. Mellon was applied in a suit by a citizen to enjoin the Treasurer of
the United States from paying out moneys for salaries of chaplains of
both houses of Congress and of the Army and Navy.5" The plaintiff
sued as a citizen rather than a taxpayer, alleging that the establishment
clause was violated. The Court followed the Frothingham case in
dismissing the suit and found that the interest of a citizen is no greater
than that of a taxpayer. Accordingly, direct aid to religion was not
disturbed.
A few cases will illustrate the justification for tax exemption. A
1951 Illinois case held:
The fundamental ground upon which all exemptions in favor of charitable
institutions are based is the benefit conferred upon the public by them and a
consequent relief, to some extent, of the burden upon the state to care for and
advance the interests of its citizens. 57
The view has been taken that the furnishing of services through or-
ganizations of a charitable or educational nature such as orphanages,
schools, and old peoples' homes, rather than the teaching of religion,
justifies the state in recognizing the church's work.58 Exemption
granted under state law to a religious school was held not to violate
the establishment clause, since the tax exemption was designed to pro-
mote the general welfare through encouraging education, and the
benefit received by the religious group was incidental to the achieve-
ment of a public purpose. The court found that even if the exemption
was of benefit to religious groups the first amendment was not vio-
53 Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296 (1908).
54 Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH.
U.L.Q. 371.
55 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
56 Elliott v. White, 23 F. 2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
57 People v. Rev. Saletyni Missionaries, 409 I1. 370, 377, 99 N.E. 2d 186, 190 (1951).
58 Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 144,151 (1949).
14 zDE PAUL LAW REVIEW
lated, since the separation principle was not impaired by granting tax
exemption to religious groups generally.5 The Illinois high court in
1928,60 in addition to recognizing that the legislature is the sole judge
of exemptions necessary for school, religious and charitable pur-
poses,61 and that authority to establish any religious denomination by
charter is not granting a preference,62 held that exemption from taxes
could extend to all property owned by a religious school even though
not used solely for educational purposes. '3 The Supreme Court in
Helvering v. Bliss found nothing wrong with the fact that "Congress,
in order to encourage gifts to religious . . . objects granted the privi-
lege of deducting such gifts from gross income ... -4 This appears
to recognize deliberate aid and encouragement to religion.
That there cannot be discrimination against a religious group mere-
ly because it is religious is illustrated in a recent 1958 New York
case.65 Plaintiffs, owners and tenants, sought to enjoin New York
City from carrying out a renewal plan. Fordham University, a
Roman Catholic school, intervened. It had agreed to buy two blocks
of land at $7.00 per square foot, relocate the occupants, and build
school buildings. Under federal statutes (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1450 et seq.),
the federal government would pay two-thirds of the difference be-
tween what the city paid for the land and the amount for which it was
sold. The city paid $16.00 a foot. Plaintiffs said that the difference
between $7.00 and $16.00 a square foot was an unconstitutional grant
or subsidy of moneys to a religious corporation. The court found that
the city was buying land and buildings and the school was buying the
same buildings subject to its agreement to raze the buildings, relocate
the tenants and use the cleared land for college buildings, and that this
re-use value was less than $7.00 per foot. Since any college could have
bid, Fordham could not be excluded from bidding merely because it
was a religious institution. The court found no gift or subsidy and no
59 Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P. 2d 1 (1956), appeal dismissed,
352 U.S. 921 (1956).
60 Garrett Biblical Institute v. Elmhurst State Bank, 331 Ill. 308, 163 N.E. 1 (1928).
6 1 Id. at 315, 163 N.E. at 3.
62 Id. at 316, 163 N.E. at 3.
63 Id. at 317, 163 N.E. at 4.
64 293 U.S. 144, 147 (1934).
65 64th St. Residences v. City of New York, 4 N.Y. 2d 268, 150 N.E. 2d 396 (1958),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907 (1958).
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aid to religion. Benefits could not be denied to religion merely because
it was religion.
In considering the Selective Draft Law of May 18, 1917 (40 Stat.
76), which exempted ministers and theology students and relieved
members of certain sects from military duty, the Court said:
And we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an establish-
ment of religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to
the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act ... because
we think its soundness is too apparent to require us to do more.66
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to pass on Bible reading
in the public schools in the case of Doremus v. Board of Educ.,1
but dismissed the appeal on the basis of lack of standing, since the stu-
dent had graduated before the appeal was brought and the taxpayer
lacked the requisite financial interest. Arguments advanced to justify
Bible reading in the public schools are that the school boards and not
the courts should decide what books should be read; that the Bible
should be read as literature and history; that reading it without com-
ment is not indoctrination; that children should all read the same
books and no one person should be allowed to determine what the
books should be; and that Bible reading is useful in spreading moral
principles.6 s However, when it came to the distribution of Gideon
Bibles in the school to those students whose parents consented, the
court, a Jewish parent objecting, decided not that religion was favored
but that aid was given to the Protestant religion, which in effect dis-
criminated against the Jewish.69
A most significant case arose in this general field in 1930 when a
citizen and taxpayer of Louisiana sought to restrain the expenditure of
state funds for the purchase of text books for students in private and
parochial schools.7" It was claimed that there was a taking of public
property for a private purpose in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court set forth the "child benefit" or "welfare" theory
which is now the basis for considerable welfare legislation regarding
school children. The Court found that the purchase of the books was
66 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1917).
67 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
68 Fellman, Separation of Church and State in the United States: A Summary View,
[1950] Wis. L. REV. 427, 451-452.
69 Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A. 2d 857 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
816 (1954).
T0Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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not for a church or school but was for the use of the school child. The
school children are the beneficiaries, and the state's taxing power is
used for a public purpose.
The "child benefit" theory was well stated when the Mississippi
court in 1941 said:
The religion to which children of school age adhere is not subject to control
by the state, but the children themselves are subject to its control. If the pupil
may fulfill its duty to the state by attending a parochial school it is difficult to
see why the state may not fulfill its duty to the pupil by encouraging it "by all
suitable means." The state is under a duty to ignore the child's creed, but not its
need. It cannot control what one child may think, but it can and must do all it
can to teach the child how to think. The state which allows the pupil to subscribe
to any religious belief should not, because of the exercise of this right, proscribe
him from benefits common to all. 71
The President's Advisory Committee in 1938 found that education
in nonpublic schools resulted in a substantial saving of public funds
and that aid in the form of reading materials, transportation, scholar-
ships, and health and welfare services should be made available to
private school children.72
In Everson the Court, while applying the wall of separation meta-
phor and holding establishment is a "liberty" under the fourteenth
amendment, 7 did state that New Jersey would be hindering its citi-
zens in the free exercise of their religion if it prevented them from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation. The New Jersey
tribunal in authorizing reimbursement for fares paid on buses by paro-
chial students "applied the well-settled child-welfare doctrine-that is,
the widely accepted idea that legislation is not void if it achieves a
public purpose even though in doing so a private end is incidentally
aided."74
Three Supreme Court cases in the 1920's rested fundamentally on
the right of a parent to control the education of his child, including
the right to send him to a private or religious school as a part of
"liberty" protected by due process.7 5 One of the three cases, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, in addition recognized a secondary degree of
71 Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook R. & P. Board, 190 Miss. 453, 467, 200 So. 706,
710 (1941).
72 Report of the Advisory Committee on Education, Washington, 54, 86, 197 (1938).
73 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
74 Drinan, Everson Case: Ten Years After, 96 AMERICA 524 (1957).
75 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 84 (1927).
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state control over the child and a considerable degree of control over
private, including religious, schools which could not exist if there
were to be absolute separation. The Pierce Court said:
There is no question as to the power of the state reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to
require that all children attend some school, that all teachers shall be of good
moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain subjects fairly essential to
good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly
inimical to public welfare. 76
But besides the three 1920 cases, the later case of Illinois ex rel. Mc-
Collum v. Board of EduC." (mentioned earlier in this article) is
worthy of consideration at this point. In the McCollum case a ten
year old child suffered because he had to leave the room when
he was confronted with religious teachings his parents disapproved.
Religious instruction in particular faiths was given on school property
by clergy or quasi-clergy. When the Court forbade this type of in-
struction because the child's feelings were hurt, it was a "dispropor-
tionate use of the great power of the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Court backed away from it in Zoracb v. Clauson.71
There has to be some 'live and let live' in modem society. '7 9 Two mil-
lion children in 2,200 cities were attending some type of religious in-
struction and "she [Mrs. McCollum] ... obtained the aid of a judicial
decree to suppress the teaching which was the very genesis of the
freedom which she exercises for herself by trying to take it from
others. ' '80 The decision, which in effect said the public schools must
be secular and devoid of religion, raised a storm of criticism. Even the
United States Attorney General criticized the decision as a distortion
of the meaning of the first amendment.8" Was not the Court saying
that "absolute separation" had become the first amendment's mean-
ing as interpreted by the experience of the people?8 2
In the abovementioned Zorach case, where the Court approved a
released time religious instruction program off public school premises,
76 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra note 75, at 534.
7 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
78 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
79 SUTHERLAND, PUBLIc AUTHORITY AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN STUDY OF RELIGION IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 33, 51 (Brown, N.C. ed. 1937).
80 34 A.B.A.J. 482, 483 (1948).
81 PFEFFER, THE LIBERTIES OF AN AMERICAN 414 (1956).
82 Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & CONTEMp. PROB. 23, 26 (1949).
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the Court said: "The First Amendment ... does not say that in every
and all respects there shall be a separation of church and state ...
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other-hos-
tile, suspicious and even unfriendly.18 3 The Court further stated:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being....
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedules of public events to sectarian needs, it fol-
lows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold it
may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government
show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe.... The government must
be neutral when it comes to competition between the sects .... Our individual
preferences ... are not the standard .... The problem, like many problems in
constitutional law, is one of degree.8 4
With the absolutist character of McCollum removed, the Court
makes the problem one of degree with each case to be decided on its
own facts. "The public policy and the individual gain must be bal-
anced against the degree of union and the amount of aid to the partic-
ular sects."' s5 Although McCollum is affirmed, its underlying philos-
ophy is changed and the Court "has taken the position that the term
'aid' means that the Church and State may cooperate to serve the
spiritual needs of the people providing such cooperation does not in-
fringe the freedom of others to exercise their religion. '8 6 The point
of reference is not establishment, but religious freedom for those who
wish to learn more of their religion, as opposed to the religious freedom
of those who do not.
McCollum allowed no encouragement or co-operation with reli-
gion, while Zorach does. McCollum requires indifference to religious
groups, while Zorach does not. McCollum would seem to find any
released time program violative of the First Amendment, as opposed
to Zorach. Zorach did not repeat the definition of the First Amend-
ment of McCollum which denied aid to all religions. Douglas's opinion
in Zorach would allow the government to co-operate with and pos-
sibly even aid all religions impartially since "we are a religious
people." Separation now calls for neutrality between religious groups,
83Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
s4 Id. at 313-314.
s5 Note, 33 B.U.L. REv. 68, 75 (1953).
86 Reed, Church, State and the Zorach Case, 27 NoTRE DAME LAW. 529, 542 (1951-
1952).
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and not between religion and irreligion. Under the Pierce reasoning
the state could release the child to his parents so that he could receive
all his education in a sectarian school; McCollum said this couldn't be
done even for a short time; and Zorach went back to Pierce.
It is interesting to note that where use of public facilities was
approved from the religious freedom standpoint, the Court forced a
community to allow the use of its parks for the teaching of religion
through use of a sound truck even though it disturbed those who
didn't want to listen.87 In McCollum public property couldn't be used
to teach willing persons in a program that was almost unanimously
approved, establishment and not religious freedom being the point of
reference.
It is probable that the philosophy of Everson, a 1946 case, and Mc-
Collum, a 1948 case, were by-products of the preferred position
philosophy emphasizing the firstness of the first amendment, which
was accepted by a majority of the Court from 1943 to. 1948, but not
thereafter. Where firstness of the first amendment is emphasized the
judicial starting point is a taint of presumptive invalidity, and not of
presumptive validity.88 The Court, having encompassed the other pro-
visions of the first amendment within the fourteenth, and having given
them preferred status, could have used Everson and McCollum, where
establishment was emphasized, to round out the first amendment. This
is in opposition to Holmes' theory of federalism expressed as follows:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of
social experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the insu-
lated chambers afforded by the several states, even though the experiments may
seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most respect. 89
The Court may well have adopted the Holmes' philosophy in 1952
in Zorach, with the preferred position of the first amendment aban-
doned.
LAWS AND CUSTOMS
There are numerous laws, customs, and practices wherein religion
in one or more aspects is aided directly, indirectly, or incidentally. It
is the religious function itself that government cannot aid directly.
Classification is important in determining whether a certain aspect of
87 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
88 ScHwARTz, THE SUPREME COURT 235-239 (1957).
89 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
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religion is entitled to public aid. "[A] church may receive police pro-
tection when classed as property, tax exemption when classed as a
non-profit institution, sewage connection when classed as a building,
and yet be denied financial aid when classed as a religious institu-
tion. .. .""0 However, there are two important precedents where
direct payments have been made to religious schools, presumably be-
cause to refuse such payments would deny students equality of reli-
gious freedom in attending the schools of their choice: "The G.I. Bill
of Rights," among its other provisions, provided for government
supervision of standards of approved schools and for direct payments
to church operated schools and seminaries for veterans choosing
courses of training in those particular denominational schools. 91 Con-
gressional pages are educated in public, private, or parochial schools,
and private and parochial schools are reimbursed by congressional ap-
propriation in the same amount Congress would pay the District of
Columbia had the page decided to attend a public school. 2
One author advocates a certificate plan under which the govern-
ment would make direct money grants in the form of certificates to
all parents of students attending approved private schools. The certi-
ficate would be valid when used in partial payment of tuition at any
private school. He also advocates as an alternative a tax credit plan
whereby a tax credit in a certain sum would be given to parents for
each child attending a private school for-whom tuition in excess of the
tax credit is paid. The author says that this is not government aid be-
cause the subsidy is given directly to the parents, and the parents and
the children are beneficiaries in that the child can attend the school
of his choice. The solution lies in furnishing aid to the parents and
child whereby they can set up such schools as they choose, providing
that they conform with state requirements in turning out citizens edu-
cated in their civic duties. 4 If the state's standards for education in
the secular subjects are met by the religious school, "It is not aid to
religion to apply tax funds toward the cost of such education in pub-
lic and private schools without discrimination."9
90 Cushman, supra note 37, at 348.
9158 Stat. 287 (1944).
92 2 U.S.C.A. § 88a (Supp. 1959).
93 BLUM, FREEDoM OF CHOICE IN EDUCATION 26 (1958); Consult Henle, American
Principles and Religious Schools, 3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 237, 251 (1955) for a further state-
ment regarding payment of fees in the name of the parent or child.
O4 Hays, Law and the Parocbial School, 3 CATHOLIC LAW. 99, 107 (1957).
95 Katz, supra note 39, at 440.
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Since the state requires school attendance it is the state's duty to
provide schools that do not violate the parents' conscience. To the
degree that the state maintains neutrality regarding religion and creed
it takes a theological position, since it assumes that religion has no real
concern with everyday life. This assumption by the state is contrary
to the beliefs of many. Certainly it is contrary to fundamental
Catholic beliefs. 6 It is argued that nobody is compelled to send his
child to a public school but may give him his education in any ap-
proved parochial school. This is equating immunity from government
coercion and freedom from all government aid to religious freedom. 7
[I]f there is to be a symbol of democracy in education, it is not the public
school as the single "democratic" school; rather it is (or would be) the coexist-
ence of several types of schools, including church-affiliated schools, on a footing
of judicial equality, with consequent proportionately equal measure of state
encouragement and support. It would be an educational system pivoting on the
parental duty as fully operative, not on a doctrinaire concept of "national
unity."98
Giving up the right to freedom of conscience cannot be the price
extracted by the state for a public education. Denial of equal benefits
to parent and child merely because of their religious beliefs is a form
of discrimination. To say that no support of any kind may be given
to religion would mean that "irreligion has been endowed and estab-
lished as the national religion." 99 Since the state allows parents to send
their children to nonpublic schools, it may not make their church
affiliation a liability to their receipt of benefits granted for the general
welfare of all citizens. 100 "The exercise of religious liberty must not
become a liability before the law in the disbursements of the benefits
of law."' 01
It has been argued that at the university level religious practices such
as compulsory chapel, credit courses in specific religions, departments
of religion, and permission of religious groups to use state university
facilities0 2 can be distinguished from such practices at the elementary
96 Johnson, The Catholic Schools in America, 165 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 500, 504 (1940).
97 Murray, supra note 82, at 35.
98 1 d. at 38.
9 9 MAYNARD, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AD THE AMERICAN IDEA 236 (1953).
100 Mitchell, Religion and Federal Aid to Education, 14 LAW & CONTEIP. PROB. 113,
135 (1949). Here Mr. Mitchell is setting forth a viewpoint of Rev. Win. McManus of
NCWC.
101 Costanzo, supra note 34, at 37.
102 For a list of specific practices at various state universities consult Burke, Ten Hours
of Credit in the Supernatural, 90 AmiucA 149 (1953); also consult Christian and Public
Scbools, 40 Pm DELTA KAPAN 302 (1959).
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school level since attendance at the university level is not compulsory,
courses in religion are optional, there is not divisiveness in view of the
size of the institution, and since the students are mature there is an
atmosphere of critical inquiry. 03 A distinction has also been drawn
between young and more mature students on the basis of the suspi-
cion of parents that their impressionable students are being indoctri-
nated rather than being given the facts. 10 4 However, Justice Frank-
furter has said: "The Constitution does not give a greater veto power
...when dealing with grade school regulations than with college
regulations that offend conscience."105
Federal funds are available on long term loans to denominational
colleges for the purpose of building classrooms, cafeterias, dormi-
tories, and other facilities owned and operated by churches under the
College Housing Loan Program.106
A United States governmental agency is authorized to award
scholarships for scientific study at private, including religious, insti-
tutions.101
The National Defense Education Act of 1958 under subchapter II
makes available to nonprofit as well as public institutions funds from
which students attending denominational schools may borrow up to
$1,000.00 per year to finance their college educations. 08 Under sub-
chapter III funds are also made available for loans to private nonprofit
elementary and secondary schools for acquiring equipment to be
used in teaching science, mathematics or foreign languages.' 09 Under
subchapter IV National Defense Fellowships are awarded with no
stipulation that attendance be only at public colleges. 110 Under sub-
chapter VII grants-in-aid may be made to nonprofit private organiza-
tions for research and experimentation in television, radio, and motion
pictures related to school operation."' The Act is concerned with the
fullest development of the technical skills and resources of all the na-
tion's young men and women, whether in attendance at public or
103 KAUPER, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION, RELIGION AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY 69 (1958).
104 SUTHERLAND, Op. cit. supra note 79, at 47.
105 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (dissenting
opinion).
106 12 U.S.C.A. S 1749 (Supp. 1959) (College Housing Amendments of 1955); 12
U.S.CA. § 1749 c (Supp. 1959).
107 42 U.S.CA. § 1869 (Supp. 1959).
108 20 U.S.C.A. S 421 (Supp. 1959). 110 20 U.S.C.A. S 461 (Supp. 1959).
109 20 U.S.C.A. 5 441 (Supp. 1959). 11120 U.S.C.A. § 541 (Supp. 1959).
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private schools, in the interests of national defense. The United States
Commissioner of Education did not see a violation of the principle of
Church and State, nor an aid to the school in that portion of the act
which authorized the U.S. Office of Education to pay for academic
testing in nonpublic schools, where the state does not have the author-
ity; but he rather viewed it as an attempt to identify students for
guidance purposes so as to reduce the large loss of talent.'
12
Health, emotional stability, and literacy come more and more to be
recognized as community assets in which government has a vital con-
cern. These assets should be developed and not simply ignored as far
as private schools are concerned because parents exercise their consti-
tutional right to send their children to religious schools." 3 Programs
promoting these matters of vital concern when set up in religious
schools leave the state and children as beneficiaries, and the religious
schools only benefit incidentally.
On the federal level we have the National School Lunch Act,
14
designed to promote the health of the nation's children and to en-
courage domestic consumption of nutritious agricultural products
through grants-in-aid, matched by the states, to nonprofit school
lunch programs. Where the state is prohibited by its constitution
from disbursing aid to private schools, a federal administrator is au-
thorized to disburse the funds directly to the private school in propor-
tion to the school population as compared to total school population,
providing that any such payment be matched. This act is a child wel-
fare benefit on the same par with bus service and health benefits. It
cannot be said to be aid to the parochial school.
The National Youth Administration Program of 1935 was designed
to assist the child in getting through school, whether secular or sec-
tarian, by paying him small sums of money earned while working in
and about the school.115
The National Welfare Conference on behalf of the Roman Catho-
lic Bishops in the United States issued the following statement on
November 19, 1955:
What then is the place of private and church-related schools in-America? Their
place is one dictated by nothing more than justice and equity and accorded the
recognition of their worth. They have, we repeat, full right to be considered and
112 40 PH DELTA KAPPAN 317 (1959).
118 Smith, Aid to Private and Parochial Schools, 96 AMERICA 155 (1956).
11442 U.S.C.A. S 1759 (Supp. 1959).
115 Exec. Order 7086 (June 26,1935).
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dealt with as components of the American educational system. They protest
against the kind of thinking that would reduce them to a secondary level, and
against unfair and discriminatory treatment which would, in effect, write them
off as less wholly dedicated to the public welfare than the state supported school.
The students of these schools have the right to benefit from those measures,
grants or aids which are manifestly designed for the health, safety and welfare
of American youth, irrespective of the school attended. 116
That the federal government has viewed the health of all its citizens
on a nonreligious basis is seen from the Hospital Survey and Con-.
struction Act of 1946, along with its amendments, 117 designed to assist
in the construction of both public and private nonprofit hospitals.
The federal contribution toward construction of a hospital owned
and operated by a religious order may run as high as two-thirds of the
cost. Facilities must be furnished patients without discrimination on
account of creed and needed hospital facilities must be furnished to
persons unable to pay for them. The Health Research Facilities Act
of 1956 s18 provides for grants-in-aid on a matching basis to public and
nonprofit institutions up to fifty per cent of cost, to assist in con-
structing facilities for research in science related to health. Financial
assistance from funds available for Indian health facilities may be pro-
vided to private groups where it is determined that financial assistance
is more desirable than federal construction." 9
Both on a state and federal level there is a considerable amount of
legislation exempting religious organizations and their employees from
labor legislation and taxation. Service performed as a member of a
religious order is not employment subject to tax under the Old Ageand Survivors section of the Social Security Act.20 Service as an em-
ployee of a religious group does not come within the Unemployment
Compensation section of the Act.'2' Were employees covered in these
two situations the employer-the religious corporation-would be un-
der obligation to pay taxes. Workmen's Compensation Acts in many
cases exclude religious organizations on the ground that they are non-
116 U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 2, 1955, p. 104.
11760 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 1 291 (Supp. 1959); 72 Stat. 616
(1958), 42 U.S.C.A. 291d (Supp. 1959).
118 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 292, 292e (Supp. 1959).
119 42 U.S.C.A. S 2005, 2005 (c), 2005 (e) (Supp. 1959).
120 60 Stat. 978 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. S 410 (8A) (Supp. 1959).
121 26 U.S.C.A. J 3306 (c) (8) (Supp. 1959).
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profit organizations. 2 2 State Labor Relations Acts have been held in-
applicable to charitable hospitals. 123 Fair Employment Practice Acts
do not include employees of religious institutions, this on the ground
that it would be unfair to compel religious organizations to hire mem-
bers of other church groups.'2 4
A host of tax exemptions, deductions, and credits have been granted
on both state and federal levels on such bases as de minimis; to tax
churches would divert money from a higher to a lower use; tax
exemption promotes the moral and social welfare of society; and the
religious institution is a not-for-profit organization entitled to the
same consideration as any charitable organization. 125 If exemptions are
granted to nonreligious charitable organizations they should be
granted to similar religious organizations to avoid restraining the free
exercise of religion.'26 On a state level there is exemption from real
estate and personal property taxation for such things as houses of wor-
ship and lands, personalty devoted to religious uses, cemeteries, prop-
erty of religious schools and colleges under clauses applicable to
charitable organizations, residences of ministers, property employed
in the publication of religious tracts, private libraries of ministers, reli-
giously owned property used for entertainment and recreational pur-
poses, religious camp meeting grounds, sales to religious institutions,
and admissions taxes. 127 Inheritance, estate, and gift taxes do not apply
to religious groups; religious corporations pay no federal income
taxes; corporate and individual taxpayers are allowed deductions for
religious contributions; and the rental value of a minister's home is
not included in his gross income. 12
Preferential rates on second and third class mail go to religious,
educational, scientific, philanthropic, agricultural, labor, veterans, and
fraternal organizations or associations organized on a not-for-profit
122 Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 144,156 (1949).
123 Id. at 157.
124 Id. at 158.
125 PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 185 (1953).
126 Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHi. L. Rv. 426, 432 (1953).
127 Consult Van AIstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 Omno ST. LJ. 461-
507 (1959), for church activities exempt from state taxation.
128 For a comprehensive list of tax benefits, exemptions, and deductions consult Note,
49 COLUM. L. REv. 968 (1949); also consult Comment, 5 VILL. L. REv. 255 (1959-60).
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basis.1"9 Here the religious group is treated as other nonprofit organiza-
tions, and to deny it lower mailing rates would be to discriminate
against it because of its religious nature.
Certainly no form of more direct aid to religion can be noted than
is found in the federal statute which provides for payment of compen-
sation to the Senate chaplain at the rate of $5,000.00 per year.130
Senate rules provide that senators take an oath ending with "So help
me God," '"3 and that the chaplain open each day's session with a
prayer.'32 House rules also provide that each day's session be opened
with prayer. 133 Since the Protestant majority would always have the
power to install a Protestant chaplain, would not the government,
besides directly aiding religion by paying a salary to the chaplain, be
lending its powers to the preference of the Protestant majority over
the Catholic and Jewish minorities? This differs from government
support of chapels and chaplains in prisons, hospitals, detention homes,
and the armed forces where the failure to provide proper means of
worship for persons whose freedom of movement is restricted would
amount to denial of freedom of religious worship."3 4
The United States Military Academy at West Point insists upon
chapel attendance. 135 The chaplain conducts prayers before break-
fast,136 ahd'attendance is mandatory at Sunday church services at the
Naval Academy at Annapolis.3 7 The sum of $500,000.00 was appro-
priated by Congress- to construct a chapel at the Merchant Marine
Academy in Kingsport, New York. 138 In this field the government,
while neutral toward individual religious groups, prefers religion over
irreligion and uses coercive means at the naval and military academies
to give effect to that preference.
Consular relations with the Papal States lasted from 1797 to 1870
with the approval of Congress. Diplomatic relations with the Papal
12965 Stat. 672 (1951), as amended, 39 U.S.C.A. § 289a (Supp. 1959); 65 Stat. 673
(1951), as amended, 39 U.S.C.A. S 290a (Supp. 1959).
130 2 U.S.C.A. S 61d (Supp. 1959).
131 S. Doc. No. 14, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Rule II, at 2 (1959).
132 Id. Rule III, at 3.
133 H.R. Doc. No. 458, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Rule VII, at 318 (1959).
134 Katz, supra note 126, at 429.
135 U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY CATALOGUE (1960-61) at 89 (1960).
136 U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY REGULATIONS, art. 0901.le (1958).
137 U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY REGuLATIONS, art. 0901.1a and art. 0901.1b (1958).
138 62 Stat. 172 (1948).
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States lasted from 1848 to 1868 as proposed by the President and
approved by Congress." 9 Recognition here was extended not to a reli-
gion as such but to a nation with an established religion.
The District of Columbia recognizes, encourages, and favors reli-
gion in numerous ways. The superintendent at the National Training
School for Boys is authorized to apply such discipline as will secure
"in ... [the boys] fixed habits of religion. '141 Water is supplied free
of charge to all schools. 4' Tax exemption is granted to buildings
owned by religious corporations including ministers' residences. " '
Religious corporations are exempted from the District of Columbia
Income Tax.' 4' The rental value of ministers' dwelling houses is also
exempt. 44 Employees of religious organizations are exempt from the
Unemployment Compensation Act. 4 ' Ministers of gospel are exempt
from jury service.146 In placing a child under guardianship the court
chooses a guardian of like religious faith with the parent. 47
Wearing of religious garb while teaching in public schools, has
occasioned some litigation on the state level, some courts holding this
has a propagandizing effect, and others saying that to deny nuns the
right to teach because of their religious dress would violate their civil
rights. 48 The question has never reached the Supreme Court, but
when it does, the Court may very well follow its holding that "no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.' 14 A religious test cannot
be required to qualify for public office.
The President's annual Thanksgiving Day Proclamation, "In God
We Trust" on our coins and dollar bills, "In God is our Trust" in our
National Anthem, "So help me God" as part of the oath of office of
the President and of the oath of witnesses, and "one nation under
God" in our pledge of allegiance all certify to the fact that we are a
religious people. Schools and government offices close on Christmas
and Thanksgiving. New York City recently closed its schools for two
139 Burke, Buses, Released Time and the Political Process, 32 MtAQ. L. REv. 179, 184
(1948-49).
140 D.C. Code, S 32-811 (1951). 14 4 D.C. Code, S 47-1557a (b) (6) (1951).
14 1 D.C. Code, § 43-1533 (1951). 145 D.C. Code, § 46-301 (b) (5) (g) (1951).
142 D.C. Code, § 47-801a (o) (1951). 146 D.C. Code, § 11-1420 (1951).
'43 D.C. Code, § 47-1554 (d) (1951). 147 D.C. Code,§ 11-918 (1951).
148 Vearing Religious Garb, 1 CATHOLIC LAW. 62 (1955).
149 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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days when the Jewish New Year was observed. The decision was
based on administrative reasons, because large numbers of Jewish
teachers would be absent on that day. 50 It would have been just as
well to justify the closing as recognition of a tradition expressing the
religious wish and feeling of a large segment of our people. When the
school authorities do not schedule classes on Saturdays and Sundays
are they not recognizing that these are Holy Days? "A common-sense
interpretation of the establishment clause can accommodate the inci-
dental, the ceremonial, and the traditional connection between church
and state." ''
CONCLUSION
We can only conclude that the wall of separation is permeable,
lacks definite boundaries, and is of uncertain height. Time, place, cir-
cumstances, and subject matter determine what degree of separation
there shall be. There are areas where none will deny that the maxi-
mum degree of separation is best for all. There are areas where separa-
tion is unnecessary, undesirable, or impossible. We must agree that:
In our life and government we are so enmeshed in religious concepts that the
effort to dissociate completely religious observances and governmental functions
is doomed to failure. It is like trying to produce chemically pure water. You can
distill it and redistill it and redistill it again and there still will be a trace of cal-
cium in it.152
Recently two women school guards were seen in a city owned car
with a religious statue on the dash board. Protests were registered to
the display of a religious object in a government owned vehicle. The
city promised that such practices would be discontinued.'53 This ex-
treme in insisting upon the elimination of an innocuous practice which
gave comfort to some, and hardly more than minimal discomfort to
others, makes one sympathize with the character in the following:
Said the physicist mounting his bicycle,
"I've discovered the ultimate particle.
The thing is so small,
It's not there at all,
And can't be described in an article."' 5
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